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Abstract Considering psychiatry as a medical discipline, a
diagnosis identifying a disorder should lead to an effective
therapy. Such presumed causality is the basis of evidence-based
psychiatry. We examined the strengths and weaknesses of
research onto the causality of relationship between diagnosis
and therapy of major depressive disorder and suggest what
could be done to strengthen eventual claims on causality. Four
obstacles for a rational evidence-based psychiatry were
recognised. First, current classification systems are scientifical-
ly nonfalsifiable. Second, cerebral processes are—at least to
some extent—nondeterministic, i.e. they are random, stochastic
and/or chaotic. Third, the vague or lack of relationship between
therapeutic regimens and suspected pathogenesis. Fourth, the
inadequacy of tools to diagnose and delineate a functional
disorder. We suggest astrategyto identifydiagnosticprototypes
that are characterised by a limited number of parameters
(symptoms, markers and other characteristics). A prototypical
diagnosisthatmayeithersupportorrejectparticularelementsof
current diagnostic systems. Nevertheless, one faces the
possibility that psychiatry will remain a relatively weak
evidence-based medical discipline.
Introduction
In their analysis on the clinical significance of randomised
controlled trials, Kraemer and Kupfer (2006) advocated the
‘number needed to treat’ (NNT) and some other parameters
to convey the clinical and practical significance of the
outcome of a trial. They indicate that such parameters may
deviate largely, so NNTs ranging from 2 to 100 might be
relevant depending on the context. It means that one may
treat 2 up to 100 subjects to establish the desired effect in a
single person. High NNT may point either to weak
diagnostic criteria for a particular therapy or to an
ineffective intervention. In their paper on the usefulness of
the medical model in psychiatry, Shah and Mountain (2007)
define ‘the “medical model” as a process whereby informed
by the best available evidence, doctors advise on, coordi-
nate or deliver interventions for health improvement. It can
be summarily stated as “does it work”?’ This definition of a
diagnosis refers to utility (usefulness in a particular
context), rather than to validity (a true aspect of the real
world; Kendell and Jablensky 2003). The medical model
assumes causality, and that is the basis of rational and
evidence-based medicine. The concept of (strict) causality
in medicine may originate in classical physics, where force
and its consequences are understood as deterministic
processes. In medical sciences, the idea of causality is most
often expressed in terms of restoration of a steady-state
condition. Pathological processes lead to a deviation from
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medical doctor to eliminate the pathological state. So the
biological basis of recovery from a medical disorder is the
capacity of an organism to restore and maintain its internal
milieu or homeostasis. A reversible disorder (or disease)
points to the capacity of an organism to eliminate or
compensate the pathology, whereas a chronic course is
indicative of a failing capacity.
The issue we address here is the empirical strength of
causal relationships in psychiatry. We consider psychiatry
primarily as a medical discipline and a psychiatric disorder
as an undesired condition that a medical doctor should help
to eliminate. A diagnosis should then recognise a disorder
and the therapy proposed should cure the patient, i.e. let
disappear the disorder (or at least helps to have a decent
life). Psychiatric disorders are primarily concerned with the
brain and their manifestation may therefore be more
variable than that of somatic disorders, because of the
higher complexity of the brain. Such complexity may be
greater than in neurological disorders. The clinical con-
sequences, including the time course, of the latter disorders
are primarily determined by underlying cellular processes.
In contrast, organic pathology is absent or relatively
insignificant so far in most psychiatric conditions, in
particular, in the so-called functional disorders, including
depression. We will consider the issue whether functional
psychiatric disorders and, in particular, major depressive
disorder can be conceptualised in the conventional frame-
work of strict causality and steady-state dynamics.
The term evidence-based medicine alludes to a firm
scientific basis of the medical practice. Often, the evidence
is based on clinical trials comparing two or more
interventions, including placebo treatment, showing statis-
tically significant different outcomes. The issue is whether a
thus defined efficacy allows predicting the outcome of a
therapy in the individual patient. An NNT=1 indicates strict
causality. The psychiatrist has to propose (or perhaps to
decide) which treatment is most adequate for the patient
sitting in his office or lying in the hospital bed. This is not
meant as a rhetoric question; we acknowledge that many
treatments are effective in the individual patient. In
psychiatry (perhaps also in other disciplines of medicine,
but that is not our concern), however, there are also
treatments that are—at least in large cohorts—a little more
effective than placebo. One may, for instance, refer to the
recent discussion on antidepressant drugs (Kirsch et al.
2008; Turner et al. 2008; Moncrieff and Kirsch 2005). If an
active treatment is hardly better than placebo, it is
impossible to make a rational decision about the treatment
of the individual patient: this is in fact challenging the
assumption of causality.
Our central question is: is strict causality possible in
psychiatry? We chose major depressive disorder as a
representative functional disorder, because of the availability
of illustrative data. We discuss four obstacles to achieve
strict causality. One argument is the lack of scientific
basis of current diagnostic systems and constructs. We
challenge the possibility of effective diagnostic and
therapeutic interventions with current classification systems.
Another obstacle is the nature of cerebral functioning: we
argue that brain processes are not as deterministic as often
thought. In line with this contention, we describe nondeter-
ministic time courses of recovery from depression that differ
fundamentally from that of reversible somatic disorders.
Finally, we emphasise that current disease markers or
psychological inquiry does not necessarily provide the
information required for rational therapeutic strategies. The
scope of the present mini-review differs from that of recent
related papers, where the philosophical framework and utility
or validity of psychiatric diagnosis (Shah and Mountain,
2007;K e n d e l la n dJ a b l e n s k y2003;K e n d e l l2001;K e n d l e r
2005;A n g s t2007;J a b l e n s k y2005) were discussed. Parts of
this paper were recently presented elsewhere (Korf 2008;
Stoyanov et al. 2008).
Current diagnostic approaches
One of the most rational frameworks in psychiatry was
Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic approach. He construed a
closed diagnostic system leading to a personally dedicated
treatment. Despite its apparent rationality, the psychoana-
lytic approach has limited therapeutic efficacy. Emil
Kraepelin is the founder of the present diagnostic
approaches and his ideas are the basis of current classifi-
cation proposals (Shorter 1997). Subsequently a variety of
diagnostic systems, including the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD), were introduced. These
systems were developed as a reaction to the psychoanalytic
framework and were aimed not only to serve the clinician
with a standardised terminology but also to provide a
scientific basis of psychiatry (Shorter 1997). It was well
realised from the onset onwards that any classification
needs a firm scientific basis. The current version of the
DSM distinguishes nearly 300 disease entities. Many
investigators consider such number as exuberant, but there
is as yet no scientific argumentation whether such number
is too much, too little or just perfect. The arguments are
rhetoric instead: do we need also 300 diagnoses of liver
diseases? A way to avoid such fruitless discussions would
be to assume that the DSM classification does not define
disease entities, but defines (psychological) disorders. But
then the question arises: what should be considered as a
disorder and what not, and do nonpsychological parameters
ever become relevant? The DSM (for instance) allows some
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tant for the diagnosis of major depressive disorder (code
296xx) than others: duration of a depressed mood for at
least 2 weeks is mandatory, but the presence of only four of
the following symptoms is required: disturbed appetite;
weight; sleep; psychomotor activity; energy; feelings of
worthlessness or guilt; ability to think, concentrate or make
decisions; recurrent thought of death or suicidal ideation,
plans or attempts. So about 170 different combinations of
symptoms fulfill the criterion major depressive disorder.
We now propose a thought—an experiment challenging
a classification system and so illustrating its scientific
status. Assume that current classification systems are no ex
cathedra formulated diagnostic standards (which they are to
a large extent) but rather as a (possibly pre-scientific)
hypothesis that may be falsified in the Popperian sense.
Then the question arises when is a parameter sufficiently
strong to falsify the DSM? Consider a parameter investi-
gated by the best available methodology found in 80% of
the subjects of a cohort and in 20% of a perfectly matched
control group [think of, e.g. the dexamethason suppression
test (DST) or with a corticotrophin-releasing hormone
infusion (Dex-CRH)] of melancholic/ major depression
(Carroll et al. 1981; Holsboer 2000). The Carroll (and
several later) studies have proposed that the DST might
well indicate or reflect pathological mechanisms or pro-
cesses underlying depression. Such reasoning does—albeit
indirectly—most often support the concept of depression as
defined by the DSM. The issue here is: could the DST
challenge the DSM concept of depression? Not likely. A
formal argument is that the DSM does not mention cortisol
excretion or dexamethason suppression as a feature of
major depression. Besides such formal argument, it is more
likely that a parameter that is present in a limited number of
patients defined with the DSM criteria will be considered as
diagnostically useless. Another example: consider a symp-
tom or parameter that is responsible for only certain aspects
of depression (say, irritability; Russo et al. 2004, 2005).
Again, would this be sufficient to challenge a classification
system? A very similar argumentation holds for the
response to a therapeutic intervention. For example, an
intervention may prove to be therapeutically effective in a
cohort, but only in 60% of the subjects. This is, for
instance, the case with antidepressants (Kirsch et al. 2008;
Turner et al. 2008; Moncrieff and Kirsch 2005). Apparently
also, the therapeutic response is not an argument to
redefining a diagnostic classification. Another obstacle for
a more fundamental discussion on the utility (or better
validity, Kendell and Jablensky 2003) of the DSM is the
publication bias. It is generally discouraged to publish
psychiatric investigations without adherence to the DSM
classification (or another classification system). These
considerations together argue that studies on (objective)
parameters (e.g. genes, hormones, course of the disorder or
response to therapy) are unable to challenge the DSM
classification system. Is this really bad for psychiatry?
Scientifically speaking, there is no argument: adherence to
a nontestable classification system hinders progress. It may
be even worse (e.g. Kendell and Jablensky 2003 and
references therein): the DSM classification may obstruct
scientific progress, because it forces to compare heteroge-
neous cohorts (‘apples and pears’) for common character-
istics (‘genes, colour’, etc.). But common sense also tells
that not every single parameter is sufficiently strong to
challenge a psychiatric classification system. And as
mentioned, one cannot attack the DSM with criteria that
were never included.
To compare with the medical practice, a first medical
diagnosis is a provisional hypothesis about an illness, and
further investigations are required to support or to reject the
initial diagnosis. The question here is: when are results
sufficiently strong to challenge a classification? We thought
that an experiment suggests that the rational medical
practice does not apply to a psychiatric diagnostic systems.
Our reasoning implies that a scientific foundation of
psychiatry by using the DSM classification is practically
unreachable. To avoid the yes/no argumentation, we
suggest a way of challenging current classification systems
by searching for diagnostic prototypes (Jablensky 2005;
Kendell and Jablensky 2003). Our suggestion is related to
the notion of ‘zones of rarity’ to indicate natural boundaries
between diagnostic entities.
Causality and the brain
Biological systems are often considered as linear causal
systems. This implies a deterministic relationship between
an external or internal event and the emerging state of the
organism. In that case a rational diagnosis and predictable
outcome of a therapy is—at least in theory—possible if
sufficient knowledge is or becomes available to the
clinician. This idea does not necessarily apply to psychiatry,
as will be illustrated with recent work on depression. The
major pathogenic hypotheses of depression assumes the
involvement of life events (Kendler et al. 1999; Kendler
2008; Keller et al. 2007), biogenic amines (in particular,
serotonin; Russo et al. 2007) and stress hormones (cortisol;
Holsboer 2000). Objective response to a stressful life event
shouldbedistinguishedfromsubjectiveresponse,becauselife
eventsare stressfulonlywhenperceivedassuch.Inparticular,
the subjective response may increase the risk of psychopa-
thology. The subjective perception depends primarily on the
memory of previous experiences, whereas the objective
response may be modified by genetic and other biochemical
dispositions. It is generally believed that the combination of
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the development of depression (e.g. Kendler 2008). Various
aspects of monoamines have been investigated including
failing synthesis of brain serotonin or genetically
programmed variations of proteins (transporters or catabolic
enzymes). Close inspection shows that 10% or less of the
variance can be explained by the environmental and
biochemical factors (Russo et al. 2007). There are also
several promising results achieved in animal models. For
instance, Spengler and associates (Murgatroyd et al. 2009)
highlighted the crucial role of early life stress events for the
emergence of epigenetic marking (hypomethylation) of key
regulatory region for the expression of arginine vasopressin
in the Para ventricular hypothalamic nucleus. This reflects on
the function of hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenal axis in the
proper adaptation and represents potential model for the
vulnerability of the nervous system to environmental and
behavioural stimuli. However, such data might point also to
the contribution of several more but as yet unknown factors.
The question arises whether a more complete knowledge of
these factors is possible and, if so, whether their number is
sufficient small to construct a useful diagnosis.
By far, most of the depressive episodes are reversible:
meaning that in the general population with or without
professional therapeutic interventions, about 80% recovers
(Spijker et al. 2002) We measured and modeled the
incidence of recovery of a depressive cohort extracted from
the general population with or without comorbid psychiat-
ric or somatic pathology (van der Werf et al. 2006; Kaptein
et al. 2007). It appeared that the rate of recovery follows an
exponential time course, indicating that the probability to
recover from depression is independent of the length of the
depressive episode. In other words, the chance to recover in
the first month after the onset of depression is the same than
to recover in, for instance, the third month. The exponential
function could explain more than 98% of the variance and
was applicable irrespective of comorbidities. The model
showed that the 2-week criterion of the DSM is rather
arbitrary and not a characteristic (i.e. an ‘incubation
period’) for major depression (van der Werf et al. 2006;
Kaptein et al. 2007). Results on hospitalised depressed
patients (e.g. Keitner et al. 1992) suggest that the time-to-
recovery curves can be modelled with exponential func-
tions as well. A prospective study on recurrent depression
showed that the durations of preceding or subsequent
depressive episodes and depression-free intervals were all
unrelated (Kaptein 2008). The exponential function of
recovery from depression can best be explained and
modelled by assuming random-mood swings: this means
that the brain might transit randomly from one (‘depressive’)
to another (‘normal’) state. Examples of fast brain-state
transitions are sleep stages, fear and happiness. Within
seconds, we fall asleep or transit from the slow-wave sleep
into the paradoxical (rapid eye movement) sleep and vice
versa. Transitions to or from a depressive state are also
fast: a positive response after one night of sleep
deprivation may disappear during (or after) a nap of a
few minutes (Riemann et al. 1993).
The occurrence of fast and random mood transitions
questions how deterministic and thus predictable brain
transitions are. Korf and Gramsbergen (2007) argued that
the brain operates as an iso-energetic system, meaning that
there are minimal energy barriers to initiate or execute
neural activities (Fig. 1). So neural activities in milliseconds
do not depend on energy recruitment but are a manifestation
of already present energy resources, designated as potential
energy. Potential energy is equivalent with trans-membrane
iongradients(i.e.K
+,N a
+Cl
-) and neurotransmitter pools (i.e.
GABA, glutamate) and is (nearly) same all over the brain.
The potential energy becomes available with minimal effort:
as with a battery by changing a switch. Brain-state transitions
may appear randomly not only to the external observer but
also to the subject himself.
Conventionally biological systems are considered deter-
ministic,i.e.thatabrainstatecanbepredictedfromaprevious
state (Goldberger 1996; Williams 1997;G o t t s c h a l ke ta l .
1995; Mandell and Selz 1995). The iso-energetic concept
allows indeterminacy, so nonpredictable (i.e. random) or
near-random (i.e. stochastic) fluctuations are possible. The
iso-energetic and some other concepts corroborate the idea
that the brain is amenable to chaos theory. In a chaotic (in the
mathematical sense) system, small perturbations have large
and unpredictable consequences. This idea has previously
been emphasised in studies on bipolar depression and related
affective states (Gottschalk et al. 1995; Mandell and Selz
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Fig. 1 Schematic representation of the concept of iso-energetic brain
in relation to complexity of neurobiological processes. To reach iso-
energicity, energy metabolism (via glucose and oxygen) is required,
which is deterministically regulated. Arrow indicates direction to reach
the iso-energetic state. Once the brain near iso-energetic nondetermin-
istic processes, such as random, stochastic and chaotic processes,
become possible, more complex functions are confined to the iso-
energetic brain and are thus less deterministic
10 Clin Epigenet (2011) 2:7–151995; Pezard et al. 1996), but has not been linked to a brain
theory. The brain may exert transitions on external or internal
signals that are not well predictable in time and in intensity.
The concept of an iso-energetic brain implies a rather loose
and often untraceable connection between input–output and
therefore challenges strict causality underlying classical
medical models. An iso-energetic brain makes emotional
and behavioural reactions to minor external triggers or life
events plausible.
Therapeutic interventions
In somatic medicine, at least four types of interventions can
be distinguished. The type 1 intervention aims to remove
the disease-causing agent either by direct challenging its
existence in the patient’s body or to assist the disease-
eliminating activity of the organism. Antibiotic therapy is
the classical example. Compensation is the type 2 inter-
vention: a component with a similar or identical activity is
prescribed or measures are taken to enhance the production
of a missing compound. Many anti-diabetic treatments or
the L-DOPA therapy and dopamine agonists in Parkinson’s
disease are examples. The type 3 intervention aims to
remove a pathological agent with nonspecific toxins,
mechanical devices or irradiation. Cancer may serve as an
example. And, finally, type 4 treatment is primarily aimed
to reduce suffering by, for instance, palliative treatment.
Each of these treatments is rational and likely to be
evidence-based to a certain extent at least. To what category
do psychiatric treatments belong? In depression, the routine
treatments include cognitive behavioural therapies and
medication (with antidepressant drugs). Other regimens
include physical exercise, sleep deprivation, light exposure
therapy and—in severe cases—electroconvulsive treatment,
alone or combined with the routine treatments. Medication
has often been thought as type 1 or type 3 interventions, but
there is as yet little evidence that deficiencies of brain
monoamines actually cause depression. It appeared that low
brain serotonin (due to low plasma tryptophan) is associ-
ated with failing impulse control and aggression rather than
with depression (e.g. Russo et al. 2004, 2005). Cognitive
therapies have been developed to correct misconceptions
associated with the depression (i.e. to reduce the impact of
life events; Beck et al. 1985). Whether their reported
positive effects are due to a type 4 rather than a type 1 (or
perhaps type 3) effect remains to be proven. Interventions,
such as physical exercise, sleep deprivation, light exposure
therapy and electroconvulsive treatment, are certainly not
type 1, 2 or 3 treatments. The latter are perhaps type 4
treatments (alleviating suffering), but that indexation may
feel as artificial. In view of the transition hypothesis (see
previous section), the anti-depressive interventions may
facilitate switching from the depressive to the nondepressed
state. Sleep deprivation and electroconvulsive treatments
are treatments that could show early antidepressant effects.
But their effects are unstable; consider the depressiogenic
naps (Riemann et al. 1993). Exercise and light therapy may
also improve mood or serve as prophylactic. Their effects
could be seen as type 1 therapies, as hypo-activity is often a
prominent symptom of depression, whereas exposure to
light activates or compensates failing mechanisms in
seasonal affective disorders, respectively. Alternatively,
these treatments may facilitate mood (and so brain)
transitions. Therefore, we suggest to adding another type
of treatment. Our type 5 treatment is to facilitate brain
transitions. This idea might be seen as an extension of type
1 because they assist the organism to battle the ailment, but
that is a rather artificial formulation for randomly occurring
brain states.
There is an ongoing debate on the therapeutic efficacy
of antidepressants (see previous sections). In several
meta-analyses, their effects appear to be modest as
compared to placebo, explaining about 2% of the
variance of depressive symptoms on top of placebo. We
have two comments. First, the response of depressed
subjects to medication varies widely: both fast and clear-
cut responses and no response at all have been reported
and second, the placebo response is relatively high and
variable. Apparently no meaningful distinction can be
made between subjects who need medication and those
who recover without medication (or placebo). Is this a
matter of lack of knowledge or is this inherent of the
current conception of depression? The placebo-drug
controversy may serve as another argument supporting
the random mood concept, and, if so, the drug treatment
is a type 5 intervention.
Most recently, there are experimental data reported
(Grayson et al. 2010) which suggest the application of
inhibitors of DNA methyl transferase and histone deacety-
lase (HDAC) as potential therapeutic agents in the causal
treatments of psychiatric disorders. This is entailed from the
assumption that altered patterns of mRNA and protein
expression are downregulated in the pathogenesis of such
disorders like unipolar depression or schizophrenia. There-
fore, HDAC are supposed to activate the mRNA expression
in these conditions.
In short, we argued that—perhaps except cognitive
psychotherapy—none of the current antidepressive inter-
ventions treats underlying pathopsychological mechanisms
directly. So an antidepressive treatment is often not aimed to
influence the depressive feelings directly, but to influence the
courseandseverityofadepression.Consideringthestochastic
moodconcept,thusassumingnear-random brain transitions,a
strict causality between diagnosis and therapeutic response
must be considered as unlikely.
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Medical disorders, including psychiatric disorders, are diag-
nosed by the content (e.g. mood), severity, time course and
coexistent factors. In the case of depression, for instance,
mood characteristics, severity of the depression, duration of
the depressive episode and comorbid anxiety, dysthymia or
somatic disorders are, among others, important criteria for
diagnosis, treatment and prognosis. The diagnosis is mainly
based on phenomenology and self-reports (‘what the
psychiatrist sees and hears’), together referring to the content
of a disorder. Such assessments might be biased by the
theoretical framework of the therapist and by the feelings of
the patient. For instance, the negative attributions of patients
about the origin of their depression (feelings of guilt and
worthlessness) are well known (Beck et al. 1985). Some
physiological parameters may affect subjective mood reports
as well. For instance, infusing cortisol gave more negative
associations in volunteers and patients, suggesting that
hypercortisolaemia might bias the patient’s report (Tops et
al. 2003, 2004).
The most explored biological markers for depression
include hormones and associated receptors (e.g. DST or
DEX-CRH), a wide variety of genes, blood or urine levels
reflecting metabolic processes, physiological responsiveness
and brain imaging (for an extensive review, see Mössner et al.
2007). These markers do not inform on the thought contents
but may be related to severity, course and comorbidity. Most
often, markers are explored in cross-sectional study designs
by comparing a cohort of depressed patients and a matched
nondepressed cohort. Occasional examples of longitudinal
study designs have appeared. One longitudinal study claims
that normalisation of the DST or the Dex-CRH test precedes
recovery from depression (Carroll et al. 1981;H o l s b o e r
2000). Despite 30 years of research and strong initial claims,
the DST and the Dex-CRH tests have not contributed
significantly to a better diagnosis of depression. It is also
not clear to what aspect of depression (severity, course,
comorbidity) an abnormal cortisol function is associated.
Extensive studies have appeared on serotonin-related genes
(particularly serotonin transporter regulating genes and their
polymorphisms) in relation to depression and life events.
Claims that severe and repeated life events provoke
depression in the s/s genotype subjects (Caspi et al. 2003)
have subsequently not been replicated (Uhe and McGuffin
2008). There is certain progress in the research focused on
the exploration of peripheral markers to define the epigenetic
risk for depression. Special interest is paid in a pilot study of
the promoter methylation of the serotonin transporter gene
(Olsson et al. 2010), which, however, needs replication as
well. To that end, we and others (Mössner et al. 2007)
conclude that none of the current candidate markers supports
the diagnosis of depression.
Morphological and functional neuroimaging have the
potential to show anatomical brain abnormalities or
aberrant physiological responses during a mental task,
respectively. Morphological changes are usually considered
as irreversible, but in depression, reversible changes of
regional brain volumes were reported (Drevets 2003;
Kronmüller et al. 2008; Frodl et al. 2008). How fast these
volumes change is as yet unknown, but most likely not
within days or weeks. Therefore, we consider morpholog-
ical changes conditional rather than causing depression
(Kronmüller et al. 2008), possibly by impairing mood
transitions. In this respect, morphological changes are
similar to somatic disorders such as cardiovascular heart-
and brain-pathology, often associated with depression (de
Jonge et al. 2006, 2007). Following exposure to emotional
stimuli, abnormal responses of brain amygdala, frontal
cortex and some meso-limbic areas as detected with
functional MRI, oxygen PET and water PET were observed
(Drevets 2003). Most often brain images of several subjects
were combined to reach statistical significance. It is
difficult to decide whether imaging results have to be
attributed to abnormal processing of the stimuli or that the
depressive state overrules brain processing. Neuroimaging
and endocrine studies have been used to define endo-
phenotypes, i.e. subjects who are more susceptible for stress
because of certain genes or gene polymorphisms. Vulner-
able endo-phenotypes have indeed been reported, suggest-
ing that the subjective perception of stress, and by inference
of life events, may render individuals more prone to
develop depression (e.g. Jabbi et al. 2007a, b). But again:
differences between groups, not between individuals were
significant.
Psychiatric disorders are characterised by the content
(e.g. mood), severity, time course, and coexistent factors.
The thus far tested external markers are insufficient to
support or reject DSM diagnosis. Few if any attempts have
been made to differentiate between associations with the
pathopsychological content or with the course, severity or
other characteristics of depression. Another unanswered
issue is whether group differences could ever become
useful for the individual diagnosis
Discussion
We have emphasised four major challenges for a rational
and causal conceptualisation of functional disorders in
psychiatry (Table 1). Each of these challenges could well
lead to the conclusion that a rational and evidence-based
psychiatry is theoretically and practically impossible. The
present conclusions are mainly based on data of major
depression. Besides making a critical analysis, it is our
ambition to suggest answers to the raised challenges. We
12 Clin Epigenet (2011) 2:7–15start the discussion on strong and weak points of our
analysis.
First, we consider some philosophical aspects. More
than in somatic medicine the question is whether a
psychiatric disorder is a real thing or a construct that
does not necessarily refer to a real world. Such criticism
is not justified, because any scientific theory, diagnosis
or hypothesis is not more than a construct that describes
phenomena as long as there is no better idea. This
philosophical issue touches the problem of irreducibility
of real-world processes and objects. An alternative view
is that scientific theories and clinical protocols have no
or little common basis. Real progress is possible only
when both the scientific and clinical views converge to
unambiguous conceptualisations. As long as that is not
the case in psychiatry, one has to live with certain and
unavoidable inconsistencies between a medical and
scientific framework of psychiatry. We considered clas-
sification systems primarily as useful constructs and not
so much as describing real world objects. As an
alternative to evidence, we considered the term ‘proof’
and ‘proven’ to emphasise causality. More exactly, these
terms indicate causality of two types: (i) strict linear
causality in relatively simple systems useful for lower
levels of complexity; (ii) nonlinear, dynamic causality,
applicable to single cells up to the endo-phenotype.
There remains the possibility to establish ‘bridge’ laws
(Nagel et al. 1971; Nagel 1979) between multitude
complexities at micro (neuronal) and macro (behavioural)
levels (also indicated in Fig. 1). In this case, we do not
exemplify empirical reduction but we may introduce
‘patchy’ reduction (Kendler 2005)o ri n t e r - t h e o r e t i c
reduction between paradigms. The concept of the iso-
energetic brain 24 may be seen as a provisional bridge law
(Nagel 1979)a n da s‘a patchy reductive explanation’
(Kendler 2005).
In the following, we suggest a strategy to explore some
of the discussed issues. The core of our proposal is to re-
analyse epidemiological, psychological and laboratory data
but not only according to currently accepted diagnostic
systems. For instance, genes or biochemical parameters
may well be related to severity, course or other features of a
disorder (Kendell and Jablensky 2003). If so, then the same
gene variants may be associated not only with depression
but also with, e.g. anxiety or schizophrenia or even with
nonpsychopathological symptoms as well. Another idea is
to relate biochemical parameters to a single or a set of
symptoms. This could give information on the significance
of some pathophysiological parameters to evoke particular
symptoms or group of symptoms present in different
disorders and, ideally, how they can be affected by therapy.
Many of current ideas on psychopathology are devel-
oped from relatively large cross-sectional or longitudinal
epidemiological investigations. Indeed, such studies may
disclose general trends, but the results are not necessarily
applicable to a single patient. A firm causal basis for
psychiatry (and any medical discipline) requires a reason-
able guess about the diagnosis in the single individual. In
practice, several relatively nondisorder-specific factors
converge to a diagnosis that has implications for further
therapeutic regimens. Furthermore, we emphasise that a
diagnosis has to define a typical condition (disease) of a
prototypical individual (patient). One aim of a medical
psychiatry could be to define and redefine diagnostic
prototypes (Kendell and Jablensky 2003; Jablensky 2005;
Nagel 1979; Schaffner 2004; Kendler 2008; Kendler and
Campbell 2008). Following this line; we suggest that data
analysis in epidemiological and other population-based
studies might focus to delineate relatively small subcohorts
that are defined by a limited number of parameters. These
parameters may include not only psychopathological
symptoms but also physiological, biochemical or genetic
characteristics. And they may be related to severity, time
course and other characteristics of the disorder. Diagnostic
prototypes might be identified with already available data
or with dedicated prospective studies. A similar approach
has been elaborated on the distinction of validity and utility
of psychiatric diagnosis (Kendell and Jablensky 2003;
Jablensky 2005; Schaffner 2004). One criterion is that in
a multidimensional space of symptoms a syndrome is
defined by detectable discontinuities. So there should be
boundaries of rarity, distinguishing syndrome (disease)
from sanity or from other syndromes (diseases or disorders;
Jablensky 2005; Schaffner 2004; Kendler 2008). If this
cannot be achieved, then there is no justification of
diagnosing syndromes. The outcome of such exercise could
Table 1 Some obstacles to reach (strict) causality in psychiatry
1. Classification systems are not falsifiable, because of
(a) heterogeneity of categories
(b) inclusion of novel factors and
(c) publication bias
2. Brain functions are at least, in part, not-deterministic, because of
(a) iso-energeticity and consequently
(b) chaotic/random and stochastic processes
3. Therapies are not directed to core symptoms/characteristics,
because they
(a) do not influence subjective feelings
(b) influence course and not pathogenesis and
(c) are relatively ineffective
4. Markers and inquiry
(a) do not inform on the core symptoms
(b) but possibly on course and severity, and
(c) inquiry is biased because of subjectivity
Clin Epigenet (2011) 2:7–15 13be the following: first, one or several of the diagnostic
prototypes are identical or very close to categories of
existing diagnostic systems (e.g. the DSM), second, these
prototypes are completely different and not easy to
reconcile with current diagnostic systems, or third such
hypothesised diagnostic prototypes do not exist or cannot
be recognised as yet. The first outcome provides a strong
support for a scientific basis and clinical relevance of—or
at least a part of—the tested diagnostic system. The
second outcome forces to reconsider the diagnostic
system under investigation and might eventually lead to
new diagnostic systems. The third outcome might lead to
a temporary anarchy of diagnostic systems as no cues for
developing a new system are revealed. Future scientific
developments may enable more pertinent conclusions in
line with the first or second outcome. In the latter case,
there is as yet no urgent need to reconsider the
diagnostic system under study.
Concluding remarks
The present assay is not aimed to provide a conceptual or
philosophical framework of psychiatry, as done recently.
These papers (Kendler 2005, 2008; Kendler and Campbell
2008) emphasise the multilevel character of explanatory
models in psychiatry and warn against too simple mono-
level explanations, e.g. at the molecular or psychological
level. We agree with this viewpoint as is also illustrated in
Fig. 1 and acknowledge the implications for research
paradigms. Our intention is to bring the discussion to a
more operational level: what should be done to rationalise
psychiatry. The medical model was chosen as starting point
in our analysis, because it is in our opinion the best tool to
discern shortcomings and weak points. Our concern about
utility of validity of current diagnostic constructs is shared
by others (e.g. Angst 2007). Our emphasis is on utility, not
on validity of diagnostic constructs (Kraemer and Kupfer
2006). From a scientific point of view, the distinction
between validity and utility is rather artificial, because
validity of a concept can only be proven by practical
testing, in the medicine preferentially by showing utility.
The medical model is the basis of evidence-based medicine:
to establish causality between diagnosis, interventions and
therapeutic effects. The stricter the causality is, the more
evidence-based psychiatry will become. We have discussed
four major obstacles: first the nonfalsifiable nature of
current classification systems, second the nondeterministic
character of many cerebral processes, third divergence
between therapeutic approaches and pathogenesis and
fourth inadequacy of diagnostic tools. We have emphasised
the use of objective parameters to develop alternative
classification frameworks. But we also see shortcomings
of this approach. One has to appreciate that knowledge
about the world is far more than what can be communicated
between human beings. One unavoidable shortcoming
might be due to the impossibility to describe professional
knowledge (or perhaps better professional intuition) of the
psychiatrist verbally that said without the previously
mentioned theoretical biases. So we might eventually have
to consider the possibility that professional experience is an
essential element not only in everyday health care but also
in evidence-based psychiatry.
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